nevertheless there is a great deal of delays: delay of procedure, delay of appeal, etc.
The third form is the change. The circumstances change m a y influence the rules and transform law.
The question of application of rules in time arises from changes in the law. W h e n the law changes, it is necessary to circumscribe the field of application of the past and of the n e w law. This delimitation is the task of the intertemporal law, which largely depends of the solution given to the problem of the division of time.
Although time is fluent, w e are used to dividing it in moments: past, present and future. This causes difficulties, since the division of time is arbitrary.
Three ways of possible action of rule in time correspond to three moments of time fluency. T h e rule's action m a y refer to the past. In this case, w e will have retroactive effect. Belating to the present, it will become immediatly effective. If the action refers to the future, w e will have postponed effect.
Three theories were proposed to settle the problems of conflict of law in time: The theory of causes, the theory of rights and the theory of f acts and situations.
In the first theory w e must examine if there was a final judiciary decision, discerning the past causes, the causes in operation and the future causes ("causae finitae, pendentes et futurae").
In the second theory, w e ought to look for an acquired right ("jura quaesita"). There will be retroactivity if it affects acquired rights. O n e must distinguish between acquired rights and the non-acquired rights or rights in course of acquisition.
In the latter theory the action of the rule will be defined in connection with facts and legal situations. T h e existence of past, pendent, in course or future action ("facta praeterita, pendentia et futura") will have to be established.
T h e theory of causes is less employed in Public International L a w than in municipal law due to the smaller -number of judiciary or arbitrary decisions.
Besides the respect toward the "causae finitae", the retroactivity is sometimes attenuated by the grant of delays that makes easy the application of the n e w law. T h e n e w rule m a y decide that a past fact did not have enough power to produce certain situations, but the past effects of these situations will be respected -temperate retroactivity.
The retroactivity's notion is not monolithic, since it's present on se ver ai forms.
The retroactivity is only one of the three positions of a rule in time and questions of time do not limit themselves to problems of non-retroactivity.
Necessity, Nature, Basis and Value of the Principie of Non-retroactivity.
The questions of necessity nature, basis and value of the principie of non-retroactivity in Public International L a w have not been discussed yet by the doctrine and were only lighty touched by jurisprudence.
C H A R L E S R O U S S E A U and B A A D E recognize the necessity
of the principie of non-retroactivity, though they admit that this principie has certain limits. However other internationalists doubt such necessity. S o m e italian jurists -as C A -VAGLIERI for instance -deny the possibility of a transitory law in International L a w and consequently reject the existence of a principie of non-retroactivity.
The principie of non-retroactivity w a s concerned by municipal legislations. This principie w a s introduced by the constituent or normal legislator or by jurisprudence. T h e the principie of non-retroactivity is liable to be con sidered as a "general principie of law recognized by civi-lized nations" in the sense of art. 38 § 1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
T h e principie of non-retroactivity of international rules w a s approved by the conventional practice, by the practice of International Organizations and by the International judges and arbiters. Nevertheless, this principie w a s deemed expressly as a general principie. F r o m the legal technical point of view the problems arisen from the principie of non-retroactivity are essencially the same both in municipal and international law. This is due to the fact that the basis are the same in the two cases.
The essential basis of the principie of non-retroactivity in Public International L a w and in municipal law results from the necessity to assure the security of legal relations. These basis are not accepted unanimously. T h e adherents of the n e w laws application, for extralegal or political reasons, often invoke the imperatives of progress against the principie of non-retroactivity. As a matter of fact, the necessity of adaptability of law to the variable conditions on international relations, under certain circumstances, requires that to the adaptabilit be superposed the necessity of security.
The principie of non-retroactivity in Public Internationa L a w is not an absolute principie, since it must consider certain externai effects.
The principie of non-retroactivity does not have the s a m e value in ali cases. T h e practice admits that the treaties and conventions m a y derogate it expressly or even tacitly. Nevertheless, this principie has a superior value regarding treaties in the sense that the exceptions to this principie must be interpreted restrictively. T h e introduction in Public International L a w of the notion of "Jus Cogens" puts the problem of value of the principie of non--retroactivity in connection with "Jus Cogens". It seems that the Commission gave to the "Júris Cogentis" rules certain consequences that turn true to the past.
The Principie of Non-retroactivity and the International
Treaties.
TAVERNIER made a statistical and systematic search about treaties signed by States and International Organizations with a view to extracting from numerous international conventions the principie of non-retroactivity.
H e adopted the most general definition of retroativity:
The retroactivity results from the anteriority of the coming into effect of the signature of the treaty, and from the anteriority of the date of the effects in regard to the entry into force. The date of entry into force and the date of signature m a y sometimes be the same.
H e arrived at the folloving conclusions:
1 -It is extremely rare to find non-retroactivity expressly stipulated in the conventions; 2 -T h e number of retro active treaties a m o n g the treaties examined is very small less than 1 0 % . This means that non-retroactivity is the rule and retroactivity the exception.
The reasons which seem to have led the States to stipulate the retroactivity are chiefly the interpretative or complementary character of the convention or the necessity of regulating a situation arisen before the treaty. It seems that the last one is the principal reason for retroactivity of treaties and which m a y be subdivided into the following:
3 -T h e retroactivity is stipulated by the contracting States in order to permit the harmonization of the time application of legal rules belonging to different legal orders, but which governs the same situation or are contained in separate conventions, notwithstanding the connected rule situations.
4 -Retroactivity is stipulated to regulate certain situations that without it would be against the law. O n e can still find the retroactivity adjusted for technical reasons or accidentaly, w h e n it results from the terms of the agreement without the will of the parties.
Since the retroactivity results frequently from an express clause or particular reason, the rule is the non-retroactivity of the treaties and conventions.
The retroactivity of interpretation.
According to ROUSSEAU an interpreted rule is not a new rule and can therefore be retroactive.
In the Chamizal Case between United States and M é -xico, the comission refuted the Mexican thesis of non-retroactivy saying that the interpretative treaties or conventions are applied retroactively.
In the Sambiaggio Case "The Umpire concludes that the interpretation of the old treaty in article VIII of the Protocol has no retroactive effect and no reference to pending arbitrations". This sentence does not contradict the principie of retroactive effect on interpretative conventions, since the protocol of 1903 in spite of its terms did not express an interpretative rule of the 1861 treaty but a n e w one.
T h e interpretation's retroactivity is admitted by doctrine and by jurisprudence. T h e PCIJ, in the G e r m a n Minority Schools in Upper Silesia Case, referring to the interpretation of articles 74 and 131 of the German-Polish Convention (May 15th, 1922) says: "... in accordance with the rules of law, the intepretation given by the Court to the terms of the Convention has retrospective effect -in the sense that terms of the convention must be held to have always borne the meaning placed upon them by this interpretation. ."
Its is characteristic of the authentic interpretationeither judiciary or conventional -that its effects go back to the time w h e n the rule interpreted appeared. This retroactivity is an exception that confirms the rule on non--retroactivity.
The cases of conventional retroactivity explainable by the principie of autonomy of the will are also exceptions to the rule of non-retroactivity.
The international judge or arbiter and the principie of non-retroactivity.
The international judge or arbiter tends to stay clear as far as possible, from questions of intertemporal law. This tendency is not peculiar to Public International L a w , since it can be found also in municipal law.
T h e judge, faced with a problem of retroactivity, is liable to adopt three attitudes: 1 -to pass it over; 2 -not to commit himself over it; 3 -to reject the principie.
1 -In the Veloz-Mariana Case that opposed France and Spain in 1823 and in the Anglo-Brazilian Arbitration of 1904, to solve the problems of frontiers of British--Guyana, the arbiters applied retroactively a n e w customary rule. They attributed retroactive effect without posing the question of retroactivity.
There are other instances in which the international judge or arbiter delivered a dubious decision.
simply that the treaty had been applicable since its signature, thus accepting the retroactive effect of the ratification, without saying, however, if the treaty was retroactive.
In the cases of Eastern Greenland and of Minquiers et Ecréhos, the parties mutually contested the sovereignty over a territory and invoked medieval titles. The Hague Court had to m a k e an option between the application of the modern rules of International L a w concerning the acquisition of territory (retroactive application of modern L a w ) and the application of the L a w in force in the Middle Ages.
In the two sentences it is impossible to discover which of these two points were followed.
3 -In the Alabama Case, the Arbitration court applied the "Washington rules to facts happened w h e n such rules were not in vigour. The principie of non-retroactivity w a s rejected by virtue of an express cláuse.
In the Mavrommatis Concessions Case, the Court attributed retroactive effect to Protocol XII, since the retroactivity derived from its terms and purpose: "Protocol XII was drawn up in order to fix the conditions governing the recognition and treatment by the contracting parties of certain concessions granted by the Ottoman authorities before of the conclusion of the protocol. A n essencial characteristic therefore of Protocol is that its effects extend to legal situations dating from a previous time to its o w n existence. If provisions were not m a d e in the clauses of the Protocol for the protection of the recognized rights are against infringements before the coming into force of that instrument, the Protocol would be ineffective wirth regard to the very period in which the rights in question are most in need of protection. The Court therefore considers that the Protocol guarantees the rights recognized in it against any violation regardless of the date on which it m a y have taken place".
Attitude of the international Judge or Arbiter in face of
the non-retroactivity of conventions.
In the Sambiaggio and Chamizal Cases, the arbitersaffirmed the principie of non-retroactivity even before considering the cases of interpretative conventions and in both cases the international convention w a s assimilated to the national law with regard to the non-retroactivity.
In the Ambatielos Case, the Court rejected the reasoning of Greece that appealed to the theory of similar clauses:
"Accepter cette théorie serait conférer un effet ré-troactif a 1'article 29 du traité de 1926, alors que 1'article 32 du m ê m e traité énonce que le traité, ce qui doit signifier toutes les dispositions du traité, entrera en viguer dês sa ratification. Cette conclusion p u être contredite s'il avait existe une clause ou une raison particulière appelant une interpretation rétroactif. II n'existe pas dans le cas present de telle clause ni de telle raison. II est donc impossible d'admettre que l'une quelconque de ses dispositions doive être considere c o m m e ayant été en viguer à une date antérieure".
T h e Court admits that a treaty m a y be retroactive if it contains "une clause ou une raison particulière appelant une interpretation rétroactf". If there is a particular clause it will express retroactivity. This exception to the principie of non-retroactivity is usually admitted; is is explained easily by the principie of autonomy of will.
T h e international jurisprudence recognizes that a convention m a y have a retroactive effect w h e n this is expressly provided for.
"Raison particulière appelant une interpretation ré-troactif" is tacit retroactivity, that is, the retroactivity derives implicity from the treaty.
There is still the case in which the treaty has retroactive effects because of its very nature: interpretative treaties.
T h e European Convention on H u m a n Rights did not have articles establishing its incompetence "rationae temporis", however "L'existence du chef d'irrécévabilité "rationae temporis" derive cependant du príncipe de la non--retroactivité des traités et conventions, lequel se range parmi les príncipes de droit international généralement reconnus".
T h e Commision bases its decision concerning the retroactivity on a principie foreign to the convencion, but that imposes itself to it in the absence of an express clause to the contrary.
The non-retroactivity and the International Law Commission.
The principie of non-retroactivity was not arraigned in the International L a w Commission. Ali the adopted and proposed texts contained such a principie with two exceptions: the express and the tacit retroactivity, inspired directly by jurisprudence and mainly by Ambatielos Sentence.
T h e fourth report of Sir FITZMAURICE, in section. 24 § 4.°, consecrated the principie of non-retroactivity:
"Unless a treaty specifically so provides, or a necessary implication to the that effect is to be drawn from its terms, it cannot give rise to retroactive rights or obligations, and there exists a presumption agains retroactivity".
But the rapporteur observed that: "There is some danger of confusion about the subject of the retroactivity of treaties. In a certain sense, a treaty, whatever it m a y say, can never be retroactive, because it can never come into force previous to the date provided for according Io its terms, or in default of clear terms on the subject, according to the principie already set ou in part I of chapter I of the Code. But a treaty can of course perfectly well provide that, although ií does not come into force until a certain date, it shall nevertheless, w h e n it does come into force, be deemed to relate back in certain ways to events that have already occured. W h e r e a treaty has retroactive effects in this sense, the obligation to apply it, or any particular provision of it retroactively can nevertheless not exist before a certain date, namely the date of the coming into force of the treaty; but that fact does not prevent the obligation that has to be applied retroactively arising w h e n this date is reached -on the contrary, it causes it to do so. It is clear that only express terms or an absolutely necessary inference can produce such a result. The presumption must always be against retroactivity".
In 1964 was adopted art. 56 which has been art. 57 of W A L D O C K ' S third report, with small modifications:
Art. 57 -Application of treaty provisions "rationae temporis"
1 -Unless a treaty expressly or impliedly provides otherwise, its provisions apply to each party only with respect to facts or matters arising or subsisting while the treaty is in force with respect to that party.
2 -O n the termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty, its provisions remain applicable for purposes of determining the rights and obligation of the parties with respect to facts or matters which arose or subsisted whilst it was in force."
Art. 24 adopted in the project of 1966 retakes art. 56 adopted in 1964, without paragraph 2:
"Unless different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situa-tion which ceased to exist before the date of entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party".
T h e Vienna Conference adopted a text that was similar to the text proposed by the I.L.C. Art. 28 retakes the rough outline of art. 24 of 1966, with some modifications in its formulation:
"Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased do exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party".
Several amendments were proposed, but~none was accepted by the Commission. A n amendment of Áustria and Greece aimed at replacing the words "à moins qu'une intention différente ne ressorte pas du traité ou ne soit par ailleurs établie" by "à moins que le traité n'en dispose ainsi". The intention w a s to exclude the possibility of tacit retroactivity, that is, the retroactivity derived from the nature or character of the treaty.
Despite the amendments, none of the States denied the principie of non-retroactivity. The proposed amendments draw the attention to the ambiguity of some words of the I.L.C. project and to the uncertainties in the meaning of the principie. The Convention text did not dispel ali doubts. This is particularly true concerning the non-retroactivity of "Jus Cogens". "Without prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in the present Convention to which treaties would be subject under international law independently of the Convention, the Convention applies only to treatries which are concluded by States after the entry into force of the present Convention with regard to such States".
"Jus Cogens" and non-retroactivity
The I.L.C. considers that the rules of "Jus Cogens" do not have retroactive effects; it is clearly so declared in the commentaries of art. 50 and 61 of the 1966 project. In Art. 50 that takes into consideration the case of a treaty that is void at the time of its conclusion due to its dispositions being in conflict with an already existent peremptory n o r m of general international law. Art 61 considers the case of a treaty valid at the time of its conclusion, that becomes void due to the advent of a n e w n o r m of "jus congens". This words "becomes void and terminates" show clearly that in the opinion of the Commision, the advent of a n e w n o r m of "jus cogens" m a y not have a retroactive effect on the validity of the treaty.
Nevertless, in the case of art. 50 (Art. 71 - § 1.° of the Vienna Convention) that "the parties shall eliminate as far as possible the consequences of any act performed in reliance on any provisions which conflits with the peremptory n o r m of general international law..." It is a case of temperate retroactivity.
Regarding to the hypothesis of the advent of a n e w rule of "Jus cogens" (Art. 61) art. 70 § 2,° says that "The termination of the treaty: b -does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination."
The question of non-retroactivity of ratification to the time of signature. (The North American Jurisprudence and Doctrine)
In the case of Hylton's Lesses v. Brown, 1866, the Circuit Court delivered a decision that applied the rule of retroactivity. This w a s the first enunciation and application of a doctrine that would be fostered more and more in the United States and would influence some European writers.
A plaintiff brought an action for ejectment, claiming under a lease from Joseph Griswold, m a d e in 1789. The defendant answered that the property in question has been regularly forfeited under an act of attainder in 1778 in accordance with Pennsylvania's Laws, and after some conveyances he had been the owner since 1780. The defendant pleaded also that any irregularity in the acts of attainder was healed by an act of Pennsylvania Legislature of January 31 st, 1783, which declared that "no misnomer or mistakes in name, addition or description, in the proclamations issued by the Executive requiring persons to surrender themselves on pain of being attainded of high treason should avaü to enable heirs, to recover estates seized and sold as forteited".
T h e plaintiff alleged the invalidity of this act, on the ground that it w a s in conflict with a treaty between United States and Great Britain for preliminary articles of peace signed on Nóvember 30 th, 1782, and which was to come into force w h e n the treaty of peace had been concluded between Great Britain and France.
O n January 20 th, 1783, the Franco-British articles of peace were signed and ratified on February 3rd of the sam e year Did these articles come into force on January 20th or on February 3rd, so as to bring the British A m erican treaty into force on either date? If the British-American treaty carne into force on January 20th (signature), the act of 1783 was void because it was passed after it.
The resolutions of the Court were the following: *'It is contended (by the defendant) that this treaty can only be considered as m a d e on the 3rd of February following, w h e n it was ratified; and in support of this opinion, it is stated that, by its terms, ,it was suspended till ratification. N o evidence of this has been given; and from the subsistence of these preliminary articles ,.. there is no reason to supose that this was the case ... But even if this were the fact, as to this treaty; .. w e do not think it would affect the case, because, when ratified, the treaty would relate back to the signing. The ratifications is nothing more than evidence of the authority under which the ministers acted . . . I a m constrained, then, to say, that the terms of peace were agreed on between Great Britain and France, on the 20th January, and consequently that the contingency, on which the treaty between Great Britain and the United States was to take effect, happened on, and was binding upon, the two nations, from that day, if no sooner". "Upon the whole, then, it is the opinion of the court, that the law of 31st of January, 1783, in posterior to the treaty of peace, which is the supreme law".
The Court invoked the authority of GROTIUS, V A T T E L and M A R T E N S in order to support the existence of the rule of retroactivity of ratification to the date of signature. Of the three, only M A R T E N S had expressed a definitive opinion on the matter: "Of treaties in general. Anything that has been promised by the chief or his agent beyond the limits of the authority with which the State has entrusted him, is at most no more than a simple promise ("sponsio") On the contrary, everything that has been stipulated by an agent in conformity with his full powers ought to become obligatory for the State from the moment of signing without waiting even for a ratification. However, not to expose the State to the errors of a single person, it is now become a general maxim that public convention do not become obligatory till ratified".
It seems nevertheless, that the agency theory exerted a strong influence in formulating such a decision. To the generality of XVII century's internationalists, the obligatory strengh of a treaty consubstantiates itself at the moment of its signature by the plenipotentiaries. This resulted from the application to the full powers of the privatist rules about the mandate.
In despite of its necessity, the formality of ratification add nothing to the validity of the treaty, that exists and obliges since its signature. It would be only a confirmation by reason of courtesy and regularity of the international relations.
In the case of the United States v. Arredondo, 1832, the Supreme Court of the United States added a limitation to the rule laid d o w n in Hylton's Lesse v. Brown, it were to be deemed as operating retroactively as to the date of signature only in so f ar as the treaties deal with rights or oblifations of the parties as States, but not as the affected private rights. This doctrine w a s stated by Moore as follows: " A treaty is binding on the contracting parties unless otherwise provided, from the date of its signature, the exchange of ratifications having, in such case, a retroactive effect, confirming the treaty from that date".
During the second part of the last century, W h e a t o m stated that "every treaty is binding on the contracting parties from the date of its signature, unless it contains an express stipulation to the contrary. The exchange of ratifications has retroactive effect, confirming the treaty from its date".
The article 421 of the Bluntschli draft adopts the rule of retroactivity (it is the only code on treaties in doing that): "Cette règle est Texpression d'un usage reçu par les nations. Elle se fonde sur le fait qu'au moment de la signature du traité, la position respective des états est définiti-vement regularisée; la ratification, qui survient queiquer jours plus tard, a seulement pour but de lever le dernier obstacle à Fexécution immédiate du traité. La ratification doit donc être considerée comme ayant eu lieu, de la volonté des parties, à 1'instant de la signature du protocol définitif".
Among the authours of the last century and begining of the present that support the doctrine of retroactivity, Less than a century ago, due to the generic acceptance, M A R T E N S said the doctrine of retroactivity was "universally recognized and accepted as an axiom by ali authors who have written on international law".
Reaction to the American doctrine.
GEFFCKEN considered the principie of retroactivity as unacceptable, unless there was a contrary clause in the treaty. Louter declared that the retroactivity doctrine held by the older authors was "the logical result of an erroneous conception which regards ratification as a suspensive condition of the obligatory character of a treaty rather than an essencial element". Other authors that adopt the same view: The Jurisprudence of the United States was contradicted by other countries.
The English High Court of Justice rejected the argument that the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles -January lOth, 1920 -operated retroactively back to the date of signature -June 28th, 1919.
In the case of Cominelli v. CAPELLI, the Italian Court of Cassation decided that the full international effects of the Treaty of St. Germain had begun on the date of the exchange of ratifications and not from the date of signature.
The *Supreme Court of Poland in Schrager v. Workmen's Accident Insurance Institute for Moravia Silesia and in Gospodarstwa Krajowega v. Czyzewics, alleging considerations of equity or good faith adopted the rule of retroactivity. But these decisions do not seem to approve retroactivity as a general principie.
Normally the decision on international arbitration courts have not accepted the rule of retroactivity. Nevertheless in the Chilean-Peruvian Accounts -1875 -, the arbiter declared the treaty operative from the signature, but he did not m a k e any reference to an international practice in this sense.
The umpire in the Sambiaggio Case (1902) considered that treaties should not be interpreted to operate retroactively unless the same treaty so provided. T h e United States answered that the destruction of property had happened at a time w h e n Iloilo w a s still Spanish territory, because the sovereignty over the archipelago passed to the United States on April llth, 1899, date of the exchange of ratifications.
The tribunal laid that "de jure" there was no sovereignty over the island until the treaty was ratified, thus accepting that the treaty w a s effective on the date of the exchange of ratifications and not on the date of signature.
The PCIJ did not m a k e direct pronouncements on the question of retroactivity of treaties.
The Harvard Convention which aimed at "setting forth what is deemed to be the existing law of the treaties" in its article 11, codified the winning doctrine:
"Unless otherwisse provided in the treaty itself, a treaty which comes into force subsequently to the time of signature shall not be deemed to have effect as from the time of signature". This article is a total rejection of the rule of retroactivity. The treaties, however, m a y operate retroactively if they so expressly provide. M c N A I R stated that "the rule of retroactivity can no longer be accepted".
The Vienna Convention seems to consider only the non--retroactivity of provisions of the treaty back even to a time antedating the conclusion of the treaty. Combining nevertheless, syllogistically some articles of the Convention, w e will see that it implicitly consigned also the non-retroactivity of ratification to the date of signature.
Acoording to article 28, the provisions of the treaty bec o m e binding at the date of its coming into force. N u m b e r 2 of article 24 declares that the treaty comes into force w h e n there is consent of the States that have participated in the negotiations. T h e consent is expressed by the ratification, w h e n it is foreseen in the treaty, in the negotiations or in the full power (article 14) or by signature only if it is so provided by the negotiations or by the full powers (article 12). Hence the dispositions of treaty become binding by the ratification or by signature (when the ratification is not required).
W e m a y n o w replace the final part of art. 28 "the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party" by "the date of ratification or signature (when the ratification is not required)" and w e will note clearly the prohibition of the retroactivity of ratification to the date of signature.
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